Why does nearly all the resistance come from the Shia bloc?
بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم
The typical answer to this question that I’ve heard from most Sunni shuyookh sounds something like what Sh. Adnan Rashid says here:
But this is an extremely superficial analysis. The short answer is not simply “Khomeini” and an appeal to a simplistic “Great Man” theory. Prior to and simultaneous with the Ayatollah Khomeini, you had several other independence movements also led by Shia ulema; and indeed, the Islamic revolution in 1979 was led by an entire cadre of Ayatollah Khomeini’s students.
The deeper answer to this question lies in the basic disagreement between Sunni and Shia: Imamah.
The Sunni theory of Imamah is that a khalifah comes into power – ideally through election by a righteous elite, but acceptably through appointment or by the sword – and thereafter all Muslims are obliged to obey him and swear allegiance to him. Therefore, the highest authority when it comes to matters of war, peace, trade, politics, etc, is the one who possesses power. This attitude percolates to lower levels of little “i” imamah, in the sense that Sunni fiqh generally accepts that the imam of a masjid, for instance, can be a faasiq, and you can still pray behind him.
When the Sultan’s interests or loyalties and therefore actions are aligned at least with the basic goals and values of Islam, you end up with a powerful Sunni caliphate because the broader population is unified despite internal failings. So, while such a Caliphate may have domestic shortcomings in implementing Islamic justice, it will at least further the geopolitical interests of Muslims as a whole on the world stage. Therefore, under the caliphate system, Muslims were usually doing quite well against external threats, and the basic values of Islam were outwardly upheld in society.
The Sunni system of awqaaf, which funds the madrasah system, was traditionally under the patronage of the khalifah or sultan. It also reinforced the hierarchy whereby the ulema are under the wilayah, or authority, of the ruler, just like everybody else.
What happened under colonialism was that the head was cut off – there is no khalifah, and all of the sultans were replaced with installed imperial puppets. The awqaaf were forcibly seized by the colonial powers. Because the ulema were already in a dependent relation with the sultan to begin with, when the sultan was replaced with a puppet sultan – and especially because now they had no independent sources of funding at all – the Sunni scholarly class lacked the ability, will, and scholarly precedent to push back against the newly imposed order. Yes – there were notable exceptions, martyrs, and even successes, but as a whole, this has been and continues to be the status quo. The basic Sunni scholarly attitude is that if we just obey the sultan, things will work out in the end – rebellion just leads to more problems and destabilization than it does to solutions.
The Shia theory of Imamah is that Imamah is based on the merits of knowledge, justice, and military ability. Knowledge and justice apply at every level of imamah, i.e., even the imam of a masjid must be just and should be the most knowledgeable of the congregation according to Shi’i fiqh. Imamah over the entire ummah is restricted to the Aal of the Prophet, and indeed, non-Zaidi Shias are even more specific in saying that it is by the divine appointment of a particular line of the Ahlul bayt.
The early history of different Shia strands (Zaidi versus Ismaeli versus Imami) and their relation to the Sunni caliphate is rather complicated and circumstantial. I want to focus on the Imami (proto-twelver) attitude, as this becomes the majority of Shia today, and, quite frankly, they have been the ones leading the charge.
The basic Imami attitude has been to follow what the Imams say with regard to the Sunni caliph. This, according to them, has been to outwardly obey the Sunni caliphs, until and unless there are a sufficient number and quality of people to actually take over and run a “correct” caliphate. During the Ummayids, the attitude was more hostile since the Ummayids were actively cursing Ali ibn Abi Talib on the manaabir and introducing several theological innovations. From the time of Muhammad al-Baqir onward, the Imams gave orders for the Shia to basically stand down and stop rebelling until the Qaa’im (the twelfth Imam) rises. Basically, the Shia were to outwardly obey the Sunni caliph as long as he did not order something haraam, but inwardly to reject him as a taaghut usurper.
The highest authority for Shias was the Imam, not the ruling caliph. If the Shias obeyed the “taghuut,” it was only because they were ordered to do so by the Imam. However, the Imams had issued deputies and more or less had a hierarchical network spanning the Islamicate wherever Shias were, already in place. Fast forward to the ghaybah – the Imam is no longer present. The Shia scholars, therefore, become the highest authority in practice for the lay Shia masses. Because of previous orders given by the Imams, the Shia scholarly attitude was that they must wait for the Twelfth Imam to return, and until then they should, generally speaking, obey the Muslim ruler (whether Sunni, Twelver, Ismaeli, or whatever) outwardly.
The Imams used to take khums – money from the excess wealth of the Shias and operated a network of awqaaf. Once the Shia scholars became the highest authority in practice, they took over khums collection and operating awqaaf, etc, such that they were able to fund madressahs and services for the poor. What this meant is that the Shia scholars had a type of economic independence from the ruling authority. Theologically, they already rejected the ruling authority’s legitimacy and were only conditionally obedient to the ruler (i.e., as long as the ruler upholds the basic framework of Islam and does not massacre the Shia, etc.)
Fast forward to colonialism. Why is it that Shia scholars were not in a similar position to Sunni scholars? Well, first of all, they retained their economic independence via the khums system. Secondly, their obedience to the ruler (yes, even the Shia Qajar ruler) was always conditional upon their upholding the basic tenets of the Shariah and the “outward” authority of Islam. Their true loyalty in their hearts was to the hidden Imam, not to the ruling authority. Therefore, they always maintained an independence of mind and heart regarding the rulers, not found in their Sunni counterparts who thought that the status quo was more or less the way things should be, and that they were required to more or less revere and respect the ruler.
Fast forward again to the Iranian revolution. What happened – I thought Shias were supposed to obey the ruler? Why are they now doing khuruj? The answer is quite simply: Shia scholars takfired the puppet governments of imperialists who were robbing their countries and trying to replace the Shari’a with a secular law. This takfir was on the basis of having walaa’ with the kuffar against the Muslims and ruling by other than what Allah has revealed, as stated in the Quran. What that meant is that the Shias were technically no longer doing khuruj, but jihad against a foreign occupier with a Muslim face.
Because, in principle, Shi’ism held that Imamah was merited based on knowledge and justice, when a power vacuum emerged as a result of jihad against the kafir ruler, who was to replace them? The answer: the faqih, who is the most knowledgeable and just and therefore closest to the ideal of the divinely appointed Imam.
Therefore, the Faqih has the greatest right to wilayah in the absence of the divinely appointed Imam, and his mandate is to uphold the Shariah. The Shariah, in the interpretation of the Wali al-Faqih (and many Shia mujtahideen generally), dictates that jihad against the kuffaar who are currently ruling Islamic lands, whether directly or indirectly, is wajib. They must be fought so that Muslims regain their independence and rule by the Shariah.
Under this broader goal are other actions subsumed. Who they support or don’t support, internal to the Ummah, is basically according to this rubric – what will result in Muslim independence from the kuffar, and what will result in the kuffaar solidifying their stranglehold. The idea is that once the influence of the kuffaar and traitors is removed, the whole ummah will be in a better position to come to a mutual understanding, strengthen itself economically, and implement the Shariah.
A short aside on the Zaidis – generally speaking, the Zaidis believe that the Imam is not divinely appointed, but rather the one who rises with the sword to establish justice from the Aal of the Prophet. Therefore, they also have the idea of supporting the Axis of Resistance and in fact have historically been far more rebellious than the Twelver line.
Lastly, there is the influence of Imam al-Husayn across all Shia strands. The basic lesson that Shias take from his martyrdom is that it doesn’t matter if they are doomed to failure; they must not fear death and fight to the last breath. This gives a strength and a courage in the face of doom that is not mirrored on the Sunni side. This may be surprising to some because it’s obvious that Sunnis have a very strong tradition of jihad. However, when you analyze it a little more closely, Sunnis have a slightly different lens on Jihad psychologically. Jihad in the larger Sunni cognizance has largely been triumphal and victorious (look at the Sahabah, look at the futuhaat, look at these great Sunni empires), not in the context of certain death and defeat. I am not saying Sunnis don’t believe in jihad in the face of certain death – there are examples of this, of course, as well as theological support from scriptural texts. Therefore, the difference is more psychological than it is theological. I hope what I’m saying here is well understood.
Going forward, it seems that traditional Sunni ulema must look back into Islamic history and find theological resources from historical precedent in order to reject the current status quo if we are to have hope in a genuine future Sunni political movement.
